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Background
The birth of a child, a cancer diagnosis, a hip replacement, 
or serious illness of a parent, spouse or child. Each requires 
a worker to take an extended, but temporary, period of time 
off from work. Most workers will experience such an event 
at some point in their life. Yet the United States is one of 
the few countries in the world that does not have a national 
policy on paid maternity leave and remains an outlier 
among industrial counterparts without any guarantee 
of paid parental and medical leave.1 Currently, six states 
and Washington DC, however, have such paid family and 
medical leave (PFML) programs or have recently enacted 
them.2 Many other states have paid family and medical leave 
legislation under consideration, including Massachusetts. 
Paid family leave acknowledges the realities of today’s 
workforce in which many workers struggle to balance work 
and family, while paid medical leave reduces the economic 
risk of being out of work for a serious, but short-term, 
health condition by providing partial pay. Paid leave-taking 
is associated with a host of positive health outcomes for 
workers and their families, an increase in men’s time 
engaging in parental care, and reductions in turnover costs 
for employers.3 
In states with paid leave programs, workers or both workers 
and employers contribute to an insurance fund and eligible 
employees draw from these funds when on leave.4 In states 
without paid family and medical leave programs, the costs 
associated with taking time off from work for a serious own-
health condition, to bond with a new child, or to care for an 
ill-relative are borne by individual workers who take those 
leaves and their employers. A statewide paid leave program 
will not cover all the costs of wage replacement for workers 
on a family or medical leave, but the substantial portions 
that are covered are spread across the entire covered 
workforce and are available to all workers who meet the 
eligibility requirements. In doing so, such a program reduces 
the individual cost to all workers and employers and, at the 
same time, reduces inequality among workers by covering 
workers who did not have any wage replacement prior to a 
program being established. 
This policy brief explores the costs and coverage of three 
proposed paid family and medical leave programs for 
Massachusetts. These are House Bill 2172, Senate Bill 1048, 
and 2018 Initiative Petition C. Each of these proposed 
programs establishes a contributory fund paid by employers 
and employees, to be used for eligible workers when they are 
out of work for their own serious health condition or that of 
a family member, for pregnancy, or to bond with a new child. 
The medical leaves considered are for own health reasons, 
including those related to pregnancy. Family leaves are for 
bonding with a new child and caring for an ill relative.
Policy Goals
One main policy goal of implementing a statewide paid 
family and medical leave program is to efficiently extend 
coverage to those who currently do not have any or sufficient 
access to paid wage replacement and to reduce any short or 
long-term employment penalties for workers who take short-
term leaves to have or bond with a new child or tend to their 
own or a family member’s serious health condition. Another 
policy goal is to structure a program in which costs ensure 
that the benefits paid to eligible workers on leave provide 
them with sufficient income to weather the temporary 
break from employment but also to make sure that the 
contributions that pay for the program are not too expensive 
for workers or employers. This means that whichever 
program Massachusetts adopts, the features should include: 
1) broad-based, portable eligibility requirements; 2) a 
sufficiently high maximum benefit payment as well as a high 
wage replacement rate, especially for low-wage workers; 3) a 
job-protected leave that is sufficiently long enough to cover 
many short-term disabilities and to allow for bonding with a 
new child; and 4) a non-experienced rated social insurance 
program that is managed efficiently. 
Each of the three programs proposed and analyzed here 
satisfies these policy goals, but to different extents. Each sets 
up a social insurance program with uniform contributions 
from employers and employees; and each uses eligibility 
requirements that are portable across Massachusetts 
employers, ensures job guarantee for workers on leave, 
and proposes sufficient maximum weeks for leaves. As 
discussed below, the programs differ in terms of how long 
someone must be employed and contributing to be eligible, 
replacement levels and rates, and weeks for bonding and 
caring leaves, which has differing effects on both coverage 
and costs. 
What follows are estimates of the cost of benefits paid, 
number of leaves taken, leave lengths, and percent of 
workers with wage-replacement for family and medical 
leaves for the three proposed program using a sophisticated 
simulator model (See box on p. 2 for details). No single paid 
family and medical leave program will perfectly balance the 
needs of workers and their employers as there is a trade-
off between coverage and costs. Yet, in our conclusion, 
we offer a recommendation on how to combine elements 
of the proposed programs on the policy table here in 
Massachusetts that achieve the goal of sufficiently covering 
workers while keeping costs at affordable levels.
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The ACM/IWPR Simulator and Behavior Parameters and Assumptions Used 
All the estimates provided here come from the Albelda Clayton-Matthews/Institute for Women’s Policy 
Research (ACM/IWPR) Paid Family and Medical Leave Simulator Model (September 2017 version). They do not 
include costs associated with administering a program.5 The simulator relies on known leave-taking behavior 
among workers contained in a 2012 United States Department of Labor (DOL) sponsored survey on family 
and medical leaves6 and our own informed decision-making for unknown behavior (such as take-up rates). 
Using the 2012 DOL survey, we estimate models of the likelihood of an individual taking an FMLA (Family 
and Medical Leave Act) qualifying leave, and the length of that leave, based on employer pay, the demographic 
characteristics of leave takers, and the need for a leave. We then use these models to simulate leave-taking, 
employer costs, and program costs both with and without a state paid leave program, using sample 
individuals from the five-year American Community Survey (ACS) for 2011-2015 for all employees working in 
Massachusetts. These estimates are not sensitive to who pays for the program (i.e. if the revenue for benefits 
are generated through employer or employee contributions or through tax revenues). Documentation on the 
model is available at http://scholarworks.umb.edu/econ_faculty_pubs/41. 
There are two types of parameters that must be specified to generate estimates from the simulator. One 
identifies the paid leave policy. These policy parameters, as specified in the House and Senate bills and in 
the Initiative Petition, include the wage replacement rate, maximum weeks of leave, maximum benefit level, 
waiting period, and eligibility requirements. The other type of parameters designates behaviors beyond those 
that can be estimated from the DOL survey. These behavioral parameters provide the simulator with decision 
rules about how people might behave when faced with the option of using a statewide paid family and 
medical leave (PFML) program. The key behavioral parameters include information about: take-up rates (the 
percentage of eligible leave takers who use a paid leave program); length of leave once on a program;7 and use 
of a program if an employer already provides leave payments that are more generous than the PFML program. 
Using the simulator to estimate actual leaves and lengths in California and New Jersey generated some of 
the information used to calibrate take-up rates and behavior parameters regarding length of PFML program 
leaves.8 The take-up rates we use for these estimates are 40% for own health; 95% for pregnancy-related and 
new-child bonding leaves; and 5% for ill relative leaves. The variation in these take-up rates reflect the type of 
leave taken (e.g. virtually all mothers who give birth take time off; most own-health leaves are short; far fewer 
use a program for ill relative leaves as there may be many caretaker substitutes and leave time required is 
less predictable); and the nature of DOL survey questions about pregnancy and bonding leaves. Take-up rates 
for own health and ill relative leaves will likely increase over time as employers and employees become more 
familiar with the program.  
The simulator imposes “rationality” on leave takers. That means that weekly program benefits must equal 
or exceed their next best alternative for someone to choose to use the PFML program when taking a leave. 
Therefore, if an employer’s wage replacement exceeds the amount of the program benefit, the leave taker 
chooses not to participate in the program. However, it is likely that some employers who already provide full 
wage replacement would encourage employees to use the PFML program and then “top-off” program benefits 
to reach full wage replacement. We have built in a behavioral parameter that allows us to input a percentage 
of employees with full wage replacement who would use a program based on a minimum number of weeks of 
leave taken. For these estimations, the simulator is directed to randomly select 50 percent of all leavers with 
full wage replacement taking a leave of four weeks (20 days) or more to use the state-mandated program for 
as long as the leave is eligible for wage replacement.9 
The data passed through the simulator come from the U.S. sample of 2011-2015 ACS 5-year Public Use Microdata 
Samples (PUMS), culling all individuals employed in Massachusetts, regardless of state of residence.10 
Local and federal government employees are excluded from these estimates as state legislation precludes 
mandating the additional cost that would accompany covering local government workers while federal 
legislation precludes states from subjecting federal employees to state paid family and medical laws. There 
are 3,534,331 non-federal and non-municipal government workers employed in Massachusetts, including 
all self-employed workers (9.8% of all the covered workforce) as each of the three programs estimated here 
allows self-employed workers to opt into the PFML program (rather than be excluded from or be required to 
participate). Their inclusion here may bias the results by overestimating the number of leaves taken as not all 
self-employed workers will opt in, but underestimating the length of leaves as those who do use the program 
may have a higher likelihood to need and use a paid leave program than those who do not opt in.
2
Program Parameters
Table 1 summarizes key policy parameters of the House 
bill, the Senate bill, and the Initiative Petition. These 
three proposed PFML programs differ from each other 
in terms of eligibility requirements, weekly benefit cap, 
maximum weeks of leave, wage replacement rate, and wage 
contributions to the program.  
The House bill and the Initiative Petition use Massachusetts’ 
Unemployment Insurance eligibility requirements which 
roughly translate into the requirement of having worked 
15 weeks and earned $4,300 over the previous year. The 
Senate bill requires 1,250 hours worked in Massachusetts 
for the previous year, a requirement similar to that of the 
FMLA.11 The Senate bill and the Initiative Petition provide 
workers with 90 percent (.9 replacement rate) of their weekly 
earnings replaced while on leave, up to a maximum of 
$1,000 a week. They both allow up to 26 weeks of medical 
leave (for own health, including pregnancy reasons) and 
16 weeks of family leave (to bond with a new child or care 
for an ill relative), with a cap of 26 weeks per year. All of the 
bills rely on a percentage of payroll to fund the program. 
The Senate bill and the Initiative Petition apply the same 
payroll contribution limit used for Social Security (Old Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance), which is adjusted by 
the federal government. For these estimates, we use the 2015 
cap ($118,500) as that year best corresponds to the ACS data 
used.12 The House bill uses a sliding scale replacement rate 
based on the statewide average weekly wage (AWW), which 
was $1256.47 in 2015. While on leave, workers would receive 
90% (.9) of their first $397 (i.e. 30% of AWW) of weekly salary 
earned plus 33% (.33) of every additional dollar earned up 
to a total of $650 per week. The House bill has a maximum 
leave time of 26 weeks for medical leaves and 12 weeks for 
family leaves and similar to the payroll contributions used 
to help fund Medicare, subjects all wages earned to payroll 
contributions. All three bills require a one week (5 day) 
waiting period before receiving program benefits and have 
the same covered workforce, which excludes all federal 
and local government workers and allows self-employed 
workers to opt into the program. The estimates do not differ 
if contributions are paid for by the employer, the employee, 
or some combination of both.13  
Estimated Costs 
Table 2 includes the total number of workers in the covered 
workforce, estimated total costs of the three programs, 
average weekly cost per worker (total cost divided by total 
number in covered workforce), cost as a percent of the 
total wage payroll subject to contribution of the covered 
workforce, average weekly benefit paid, total number of 
leaves eligible and covered by the PFML program, and 
number of leaves as a percent of the covered workforce. 
The costs vary from a total of just under $620 million 
to about $950 million, with an average annual cost per 
worker ranging from $175 to $269, and an average weekly 
contribution of $3.37 to $5.16. In each of the three programs 
these costs would be split between employer and employee.  
Contribution rates, or the percentage of wages withheld 
needed to pay for program benefits, are determined by 
the dollar value of the annual payroll base divided by the 
estimated annual total cost.14 These rates range from 0.33% 
in the House bill to 0.55% in the Senate bill and 0.61% for 
the Initiative Petition. The average weekly benefit ranges 
from $481 in the House bill to $748 in the Senate bill. The 
estimates of the number of leaves taken over a year that 
Table 1. PFML Program Policy Parameters 
  House Bill (H. 2172) Senate Bill (S. 1048) 2018 Initiative Petition
Eligibility (weeks, hours, and/or earnings 
in Massachusetts over previous year)
15 weeks worked and  
$4,300 earned 1,250 hours worked
15 weeks worked and  
$4,300 earned 
Maximum weekly benefit payment $650 $1,000 $1,000 
Maximum weeks - Medical leave 26 26 26
Maximum weeks - Family leave 12 16 16
Weekly wage replacement rate .9 to 30% of AWW*; then .33 0.9 0.9
Waiting period 1 week 1 week 1 week
Employees covered 
All private sector employees; 
state government employees; 
self-employed
All private sector employees; 
state government employees; 
self-employed
All private sector employees; 
state government employees; 
self-employed
Wages subject to contribution All wages Up to $118,500** Up to $118,500**
*AWW is the statewide average weekly wage which was $1,256.47 as of October 2015.
**This is the maximum amount subject to Social Security (Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance) payroll contribution in 2015 and 2016.
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would be covered under the new PFML programs range 
from 126,500 under the Senate bill to 144,000 under the 
House bill, and 147,400 under the Initiative Petition. 
Program leaves represent between 3.6% and 4.2% of the total 
covered workforce. Since some workers take more than one 
leave in a year, the percentage of covered employees taking a 
leave is between 3.0% and 3.5%. While there are many more 
leaves taken, only between 21 and 25 percent of those leaves 
would be covered under any of these PFML programs. There 
are many reasons why the majority of leave takers would not 
use a statewide PFML program. Most leaves are short (half 
of all leaves are for three weeks or less), some employees may 
have better coverage from their employer, and others might 
not apply because their leave patterns are unpredictable (as 
are many ill relative leaves) or because of lack of knowledge 
of the program.15 
The main reasons why the costs and 
average weekly benefits vary among the 
three programs relate to differing eligibility 
requirements, maximum benefits, and 
replacement rates. The House bill and 
Initiative Petition, using UI eligibility rules, 
include more part-time workers than the 
Senate bill’s requirement of 1,250 annual 
hours of employment. As a result, fewer 
people are eligible and then use the program 
in the Senate bill so the cost is lower than 
the Initiative Petition, but those who are 
eligible have higher income resulting in a 
higher average weekly benefit.16 The lower 
maximum benefit paid as well as the sliding 
scale in the House bill result in a lower total 
cost and lower average benefit than the other 
two programs. 
Table 2 includes the average weekly costs and 
benefits paid. In order to better understand 
the contribution and benefit levels for 
particular workers, Table 3 provides the total 
annual and weekly contribution owed and benefit received 
by: 1) a worker who receives the median weekly earnings 
of the covered workforce;17 2) a full-time (40-hour a week) 
minimum wage worker; and 3) someone earning $118,500 a 
year. The 2011-2015 Massachusetts ACS indicates that 8.6% 
of the covered workforce earns $118,500 or more while 29.4% 
earn less than $440 a week (40 hours at $11/hour). 
Median Wage Earners
The total weekly contribution for a worker earning the 
median weekly wage of $776.60 ranges from $2.59 in 
the House bill to $4.70 in the Initiative Petition. If the 
contributions were paid equally by the employer and the 
employee, each would be making an annual contribution 
of $67.50 (half of $135) to $122 ($244 divided by two). The 
Table 2. Total Estimated Program Costs and Usage
  House Bill  (H. 2172)




Covered employees 3,534,331 3,534,331 3,534,331
Cost of program (in millions) $619.0 $867.6 $949.2 
Average yearly cost per worker* $175 $245 $269
Average weekly cost per worker $3.37 $4.72 $5.16
Payroll contribution rate** 0.33% 0.55% 0.61%
Average weekly benefit paid $481 $748 $700
Annual program leaves 144,000 126,500 147,400
Program leaves as percentage 
of employment 4.1% 3.6% 4.2%
*Total cost/covered workforce 
**All wages are subject to contributions in the House bill. Contributions in the Senate 
bill and Initiative Petition are based on wages earned up to $118,500. 
Notes: Data are based on September 2, 2017 version of ACM/IWPR Paid Family and 
Medical Leave Simulation Model.
Estimated costs provided do not include administrative costs. 
Table 3. Annual and Weekly Contribution and Weekly Benefit for Median Earner,  
Full-time Minimum Wage Earner, and Worker Earning $118,500 Annually
Median Wage Earner  
($776.60 per week)
Minimum Wage Earner  
($11/hour, 40 hours/week)





















(H. 2172) $135 $2.59 $471 $76 $1.47 $360 $396 $7.61 $650
Senate Bill 
(S. 1048) $223 $4.30 $699 $127 $2.43 $396 $655 $12.60 $1,000
Initiative 
Petition $244 $4.70 $699 $138 $2.66 $396 $717 $13.79 $1,000
Notes: Data are based on the September 2, 2017 version of the ACM/IWPR Paid Family and Medical Leave Simulation. Model. These dollar 
amounts are the total contribution made by both employer and employee.  Calculations are based on contribution rates in Table 2. The 
annual contribution of median and minimum wage earnings are calculated by multiplying weekly rate by 52.  
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worker earning the median weekly wage of $776.60 would 
receive $471 (61% of that wage) a week under the House bill 
and $699 (90% of that wage) under the Senate bill and the 
Initiative Petition.
Minimum Wage Workers
The weekly cost for a full-time minimum wage worker 
covered in the program would be between $1.47 and $2.66 
a week. If split equally among employer and employee, that 
amounts to an annual contribution of $38 to $69 by each. 
Weekly benefits when eligible and on the PFML program 
for a full-time minimum wage worker earning $440 a week 
under the House bill would be $360 and only slightly higher 
at $396 under the Senate bill and the Initiative Petition.  
Workers Earning $118,500 (Maximum amount subject to 
Social Security payroll contribution)
The weekly cost for a worker earning an annual salary of 
$118,500 (which would also be the contribution cap under 
the Senate bill and the Initiative Petition) ranges from $7.61 
to $13.79 a week (or $198 to $359 annually when split equally 
between employer and employee). The worker earning 
$118,500 annually ($2,280 weekly) would get the maximum 
benefit under all three programs: $650 which would be 23% 
of that worker’s weekly wage and $1,000 which would be 
44% of the weekly wage.
Coverage in PFML Programs
Table 4 provides simulator estimates of the number of 
people who would use the PFML program, the average 
length of time on the program, and the percentage of 
workers who would receive any form of wage replacement 
by the type of leave taken. The vast majority of leaves (about 
61 percent) taken using any of the PFML programs are 
for non-pregnancy own-health related reasons, followed 
by leaves for a new child (19 percent), pregnancy (about 
17 percent) and to care for an ill relative (2 percent). We 
estimate the average length of leave using the program for 
all leaves to be between 10.5 and 10.9 weeks. Pregnancy 
leaves are the longest at about 14.5 weeks, followed by own 
health leaves at just over 11 weeks. Ill-relative leaves are, on 
average, the shortest. 
The last section in Table 4 provides the percentage of all 
workers who have any form of wage replacement while 
on a family or medical leave in the presence of each of 
these PFML programs. Currently in Massachusetts paid 
family leave and short-term medical leave for a serious 
health condition or pregnancy are provided by individual 
employers that choose to provide this benefit, through 
union negotiated contracts, or through privately purchased 
short-term disability insurance policies. This leaves many 
workers uncovered. In 2016, only 14% of all U.S. workers had 
access to paid family leave from their employers, 38% had 
access to short-term disability leave, and 68% had paid sick 
leave.18 While our simulator relies on DOL survey data and 
allows us to determine if a worker on a family or medical 
leave19 received any wage replacement, we cannot use the 
survey to estimate what form that pay takes. Therefore, the 
wage replacement estimates in Table 4 include workers who 
use vacation days, paid sick days, a disability insurance 
policy, employer paid family or medical leave, and with the 
proposed PFML program. 
As depicted in Table 5, without a statewide program 
in place, the simulator estimates that 73.1% of workers 
have some form of wage replacement. The House bill and 
Initiative Petition boost that average to 80.4% while the 
Senate bill increases access to paid leave to 78.8% of all 
workers on leave.  
One of the most important reasons to implement a 
statewide paid family leave program is to provide this 
crucial work-related benefit to cover workers who need 
to take an extended paid family or medical leave but 
currently have no access to paid leave or insufficient 
coverage. A troubling aspect of the current landscape of 
wage-replacement for workers who take family and medical 
Table 4. Number of PFML Program Leaves, Average 
Leave Length while on Program, and Percent of All 
Leaves with Any Wage Replacement, by Leave Type
  House Bill  (H. 2172)





Program leaves taken 
Own health 87,500 78,500 89,900
Pregnancy 25,700 20,700 26,000
New child 27,500 24,600 28,200
Ill relative 3,300 2,700 3,300
All leaves 144,000 126,500 147,400
Average weeks of leave on program
Own health 11.0 11.3 11.3
Pregnancy 14.3 14.6 14.5
New child 6.4 6.9 7.2
Ill relative 3.1 3.2 3.3
All leaves 10.5 10.8 10.9
Percent of leaves with wage replaced 
Own health 79.3% 77.6% 79.3%
Pregnancy 93.5% 89.3% 93.5%
New child 94.6% 90.8% 94.5%
Ill relative 75.1% 75.0% 75.2%
All leaves 80.4% 78.8% 80.4%
Note: Data provided here uses the September 2, 2017 version of 
ACM/IWPR Paid Family and Medical Leave Simulation Model.
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leave is that they are available unevenly across employers 
and employees. Three groups of workers are particularly at 
risk of not being covered. This includes female employees, 
because they are more likely than male employees to take 
a leave, especially for a new child. The other two groups are 
low-wage workers (who tend to younger, non-white, and 
low-income) and workers employed by smaller companies. 
Employers prefer to provide this benefit to attract and keep 
higher wage workers, while many small firms tend to have 
less capacity to offer this benefit to all of its workers. 
Table 5 depicts the percentage of workers by various 
worker characteristics currently covered and who would 
be covered with wage replacement under each of the 
three PFML programs. Black, Latinx, young, poor, near 
poor, and low-wage workers as well as those who work for 
small-sized firms are the least likely to currently have any 
forms of wage replacement, with rates typically at least ten 
percentage points below the average. All three programs 
provide a larger boost in access for these workers than their 
counterparts, narrowing the gap between those with and 
those without any paid family or medical leave. And while 
the gap between male and female workers is not wide, the 
House bill and the Initiative Petition provide near parity.  
Table 5. Percent of Workers with Any Wage Replacement by Characteristic of Worker,  
At Present and Under Proposed PFML Programs 
Percent of Wage Replaced Currently House Bill  (H. 2172)




Total 73.1% 80.4% 78.8% 80.4%
Sex
Male 75.1% 81.0% 80.1% 81.2%
Female 71.5% 79.8% 77.6% 79.8%
Race
White 74.6% 81.3% 79.7% 81.4%
Black 65.5% 75.2% 73.4% 75.6%
Asian or Pacific Islander 75.4% 82.0% 81.3% 82.0%
Latino 61.0% 73.1% 70.3% 73.3%
Age group
16-24 41.2% 53.5% 48.8% 53.4%
25-44 73.4% 82.6% 80.9% 82.6%
45-64 79.9% 84.4% 83.6% 84.6%
65 & older 68.8% 75.1% 72.4% 75.2%
Family income level
Above median 85.1% 89.1% 88.5% 89.3%
At or below median 60.0% 71.0% 68.2% 71.0%
Poverty level
Below Federal Poverty Level (FPL) 26.4% 43.0% 35.5% 43.5%
Between 100-199% FPL 51.4% 67.2% 62.7% 67.2%
200% FPL & above 79.2% 84.9% 83.9% 84.9%
Hourly wage level
Earns $15 or more 79.8% 85.5% 84.3% 85.7%
Earns less than $15 57.5% 68.4% 65.9% 68.5%
Employer size
1-9 employees 62.1% 72.1% 69.6% 72.1%
10-49 employees 62.1% 73.1% 70.9% 72.8%
50-99 employees 75.2% 81.8% 80.3% 82.1%
100-499 employees 75.7% 82.3% 80.9% 82.1%
500 or more employees 77.0% 83.3% 81.9% 83.5%
Note: Data are based on the September 2, 2017 version of ACM/IWPR Paid Family and Medical Leave Simulation Model.
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Policy Trade-offs
In conclusion, each of the proposed PFML programs provide 
for more universal coverage for workers with their own 
serious health conditions, those giving birth, those bonding 
with a newly born or adopted child, and those caring for 
an ill relative. And each does so by spreading and sharing 
the costs across most of the Massachusetts workforce. The 
programs do, however, vary by costs as well as coverage 
highlighting the trade-offs involved in designing a program. 
It is important to consider the following differences in the 
proposed paid family and medical leave programs now 
under consideration by the legislature:  
Eligibility Requirements
• The broader the eligibility requirements, the more 
workers receive coverage; the more workers covered, 
the higher the costs. 
Wage Replacement Rates and Maximum Benefit
• The higher the wage replacement rate and the higher 
the maximum benefit, the greater the number of 
program users and longer length of usage, resulting in 
higher costs.  
• Evidence from elsewhere indicates that low-wage 
workers, some of the workers with the least amount 
of coverage now, are much more likely to use a paid 
leave program if the replacement rate is high.20 A 
sliding scale replacement schedule would allow for 
higher replacement rates for lower-waged workers 
which would increase their participation and reduce 
the overall cost of a program.  
Leave Length Maximum
• The higher the maximum number of weeks allowed, 
the higher the costs. All three programs provide 26 
weeks of medical leave which would cover the vast 
majority of current medical leaves and is consistent 
with paid medical leaves in the states that already 
have a program.21 Gauging the appropriate length 
for family leaves is more challenging. The most 
predictable of these leaves is to bond with a new child 
and each of these bills provide 12 to 16 weeks of family 
leave. Nonetheless, in the states with paid family leave 
programs, far  fewer workers use paid family leave 
programs than they do medical leaves, which implies 
that the number of weeks allowed will not be a large 
cost driver.  
Balancing Coverage and Costs
All three proposed paid family and medical leave programs 
contain elements that achieve the key policy goal of 
extending wage replacement that allow families to balance 
work, family, and medical needs. To do so will cost money, 
but even after taking into account administrative costs, we 
estimate that the total cost will be less than one percent 
of total payroll. Taking the various trade-offs into account 
and placing the highest priority on coverage followed by 
cost, some combination of the three proposed programs, 
in our opinion, would strike the right balance.  Specifically, 
we suggest usage of the eligibility requirements of the 
House bill and the Initiative Petition programs of 15 weeks 
worked and $4,300 (earned in the last year); applying a more 
generous sliding scale to the weeks covered in the House 
bill (26 for medical and 12 for family leave), and utilizing the 
maximum benefit of $1,000 a week contained in the Senate 
bill and the Initiative Petition. This combination would 
assure broad-based coverage for workers in need, provide 
adequate wage replacement, and still remain affordable.   
7
Notes
1 The OECD Database publishes information about paid parental and ill relative leave arrangements in all the OECD countries at www.
oecd.org/social/family/database.htm. See PF2.1 Key characteristics of parental leave systems and PF2.3 Additional leave entitlements of 
working parents for a country-by-country description of leave provisions. In an extensive survey of legislation in 22 OECD countries, 
Jody Heymann, Hye Jin Rho, John Schmitt, and Alison Earle find that the United States is the only country that has no guaranteed paid 
sick leave. (Contagion Nation: A Comparison of Paid Sick Day Policies in 22 Countries, Washington DC: Center for Economic and Policy 
Research at http://cepr.net/documents/publications/paid-sick-days-2009-05.pdf, retrieved December 1, 2015).
2 The states that currently have paid family and medical leave programs are California, New Jersey and Rhode Island.  Hawaii and New 
York have a paid medical leave insurance program. New York recently enacted paid family leave. Washington DC and Washington state 
also recently enacted paid family and medical leave legislation.
3 For a summary of the benefits associated with paid leave see Barbara Gault et al. Paid Parental Leave in the United States: What the Data 
Tell Us About Access, Usage, and Economic and Health Benefits, Institute for Women’s Policy Research, January 23, 2014 https://iwpr.org/
publications/paid-parental-leave-in-the-united-states-what-the-data-tell-us-about-access-usage-and-economic-and-health-benefits; 
and AEI-Brookings Working Group on Paid Family Leave, Paid Family and Medical Leave: An Issue Whose Time Has Come, American 
Enterprise Institute and Brookings Institution, May 2017 www.brookings.edu/research/paid-family-and-medical-leave-an-issue-whose-
time-has-come.
4 New York and Hawaii (with only a paid medical leave program) rely on private insurers while all the other states administer their own 
programs. A Better Balance maintains a comprehensive and up-to-date list of the parameters of state programs at www.abetterbalance.
org/resources/paid-family-leave-laws-chart.
5 These costs as well as start-up costs are beyond the scope of what the simulator is designed to do. Administration costs will depend on 
which entity runs the program, the amount of outreach performed, and to some degree the parameters of the program itself.
6 Jacob Alex Klerman, Kelly Daley, and Alyssa Pozniak, Family and Medical Leave in 2012: Technical Report, Abt Associates, prepared for the 
U.S. Department of Labor (2013).
7 Due to small sample sizes and lack of information on state of residence or work, the publicly provided data from the DOL survey does 
not allow an accurate measure of leave lengths for those leave takers who use one of the already existing statewide programs. The model 
was updated in 2016 to allow the user various ways to extend leave lengths that better approximate lengths observed in states with 
paid family and medical leaves as well as to change the probability of taking a leave with a program in place. These estimates reflect 
that update and as such leave lengths using the program that are longer than estimated in previous versions of the model and better 
approximate those of states with paid medical leaves.
8 This is done by running the simulator under various take-up rates and extension of leave options for those states using parameters of 
their existing programs and using those that are within the ranges that best approximate actual numbers of leaves and leave lengths.
9 There is some evidence that firms do this. In addition, a 2015 Paid Family Leave Market Research report on California’s Paid Family 
Leave program conducted for California’s Employment Development Department (www.edd.ca.gov/disability/pdf/Paid_Family_Leave_
Market_Research_Report_2015.pdf) finds that between 40%- 50% of women taking paid family leave with incomes over $60,000 used 
“integrated” benefits – a combination of program and employer pay (p. 41).
10 In addition, a “cloning” device is used to reduce simulation error by creating several duplicates of the same person to run through the 
simulation. A cloning factor of 30 is used for the estimations here (i.e. each person is run through the model 30 independent times, with 
the weight of each person reduced by a factor of 30). This reduces the variability of estimates for any given run of the model which uses 
a “random wheel” spin for probabilities of taking and needing a leave. Still, there will be some variability in results across runs of the 
simulator, but typically less than 1 percent. 
11 Eligibility for the FMLA is more stringent in that it requires workers be employed with the same employer for 1,250 hours and that 
employer must employ 50 or more employees within a 75-mile radius. 
12 The cap in 2016 was also $118,500. However, the 2017 cap rose to $127,200. Using this value reduces the contribution rate in the Senate bill 
and the Initiative Petition by .009%.
13 Limitation in the DOL survey and the ACS do not allow us to incorporate broader definitions of family members beyond parent, spouse 
and child.
14 This only accounts for the costs of benefit payment and does not include any administration costs.
15 Other reasons why this occurs are discussed in our 2016 report, It’s About Time: Cost and Coverage of Paid Family Leave in Massachusetts.
16 The simulation model estimates that 87.5% of all covered workers would be eligible for the House bill and the Initiative Petition PFML 
programs, while 73.3% of all covered workers would be eligible under the Senate bill. This assumes that all self-employed workers are 
among the covered workforce (i.e. making contributions) and would be eligible.
17 Determined using the ACS 2011-2015.
18 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey, 2016, Tables 16 and 32. Retrieved September 15, 
2017 at www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2016/ownership_civilian.htm. 
19 As defined by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).
20 Eileen Appelbaum and Ruth Milkman, Leaves That Pay: Employer and Worker Experiences with Paid Family Leave in California Center for 
Economic and Policy Research, 2011, http://cepr.net/documents/publications/paid-family-leave-1-2011.pdf.
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